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Public procurement is increasingly viewed as having important potential to drive innovation. Despite this
interest, numerous barriers prevent the public sector from acting as an intelligent and informed customer. This
paper seeks to understand how barriers related to processes, competences, procedures and relationships in
public procurement inﬂuence suppliers' ability to innovate and to reap the beneﬁts of innovation. We address
this by exploiting a dedicated survey of public sector suppliers in the UK, using a probit model to investigate
the inﬂuence of structural, market and innovation determinants on suppliers' perception of these barriers.
The main barriers reported by suppliers refer to the lack of interaction with procuring organisations,
the use of over-speciﬁed tenders as opposed to outcome based speciﬁcations, low competences of
procurers and a poor management of risk during the procurement process. Such barriers are perceived
most strongly by R&D intensive organisations. Our results also indicate that certain organisations,
particularly smaller ﬁrms and not-forproﬁt organisations, encounter greater difﬁculties with innovation
arising from the procurement process, for instance in relation to contract size, lack of useful feedback and
communication of opportunities. Government procurement policies are queried in light of the ﬁndings.
Crown Copyright & 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
The use of public procurement to stimulate private sector innova-
tion has been a much-debated issue of late, particularly in the context
of so-called ‘demand-side’ innovation policies (Edler et al., 2006;
OECD, 2011). While this debate is not new, it has seen a renewed
impetus in policy discussions in the European Union (Kok, 2004; Aho
et al., 2006) and across the OECD (Myoken, 2010; OECD, 2011). For
instance, the OECD (2011) examined a range of experiences in the use
of targeted demand-side innovation policies, including public procure-
ment, regulation, standards, user-led innovation initiatives, and ‘lead
market’ policies (see also European Commission, 2007). Further, the
Europe 2020 strategy includes public procurement as one of the key
market-based policy instruments for smart, sustainable and inclusive
growth (European Commission, 2010).
It has been argued that public procurement can help counteract
market and systemic failures hindering innovation (Edler and
Georghiou, 2007; Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012). Put simply,
the public sector can overcomemarket failures by enlarging themarket
for certain goods and services, thus ensuring sufﬁcient critical mass to
encourage R&D investment. The public sector also inﬂuences standards
through procurement, thus facilitating diffusion (Blind, 2013). Public
procurement can also help offset systemic failures by enabling inter-
action between users and potential suppliers, and by articulating and
signalling unmet needs to the market. While the ﬂexibility for
interaction during a procurement process is regulated in all countries
that are part of the Government Procurement Agreement in the WTO
and EU Directives, there is still is ample room for general engagement
to signal market needs upstream, and a range of legal procedures such
as Competitive Dialogue allow for controlled interaction even during
the procurement phase (Arrowsmith and Treumer, 2012; Treumer and
Uyarra, 2013). Finally, the use of public procurement has been
associated with the emergence of so-called ‘lead markets’ (see e.g.
Geroski, 1990, Georghiou, 2007; Edler and Georghiou, 2007).
Innovation scholars have provided empirical evidence of the
impact on innovation of public procurement vis-à-vis traditional
innovation policy instruments. For instance, Rothwell and Zegveld
(1981) found that procurement was more likely to generate innova-
tions than R&D subsidies. Geroski (1990) reviewed a series of
innovations emerging from public procurement and concluded that,
provided certain conditions were met, procurement was an effective
means to stimulate innovation. Aschhoff and Sofka (2009) contrasted
the effects of procurement vis-à-vis other instruments (regulation,
R&D subsidies and university research) on the innovation activities of
German enterprises and found that both public procurement and the
provision of knowledge infrastructure in universities had positive
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effects on innovation success. Using Innobarometer data for
2006–2008, Guerzoni and Raiteri (2012) also observed that public
procurement had a greater inﬂuence in stimulating ﬁrms’ innovation
behaviour than R&D subsidies, but noted that the strongest effects on
innovation occurred when both instruments were combined.
Despite this body of work, few studies have investigated in detail
the speciﬁc conditions or mechanisms within public procurement
that actually lead to, or hinder, innovation (Geroski, 1990; Rothwell
and Zegveld, 1981). Given the multitude of practices and procedures
involved in the procurement process, what matters in order to
inform policy design and implementation is not so much whether it
can inﬂuence innovation but how and under what conditions that
impact takes (or could potentially take) place.
This is an important issue because, despite the perception of
procurement as something of a policy panacea and repeated efforts to
put procurement budgets towork to drive innovation, efforts have been
met with limited success (NESTA, 2012). Barriers to effective imple-
mentation, including organisational, regulatory, skills and the inherent
risk aversion of the public sector, have been documented in the
literature (see e.g. Wilkinson et al., 2005; Rolfstam, 2013). However
this evidence tends to be anecdotal, case-study based and at times not
consistent. This article provides a contribution in that it uses adedicated
and original survey to capture the perceptions and experiences of a
broad range of suppliers, including small ﬁrms and third sector
organisations (not-for-proﬁt and non-governmental organisations),
across different sectors and areas of the public sector. This paper thus
underpins, qualiﬁes and amends existing evidence by shedding a
quantitative light on these questions: What are the main barriers that
prevent the government from capturing innovation through public
procurement? How do different types of suppliers experience these
barriers? More speciﬁcally, the paper investigates the inﬂuence of
structural, market and innovation determinants on suppliers' percep-
tions of these barriers.
We analyse this issue by looking at the UK and in particular we
draw from a dedicated survey of 800 suppliers to the UK public
sector. The UK is an interesting case to assess the development of
these policies because it is considered a ‘ﬁrst mover’ (Edler and
Uyarra, 2013) in the promotion of policies and initiatives seeking
to stimulate innovation through public procurement, as well as
addressing the modernisation of public procurement more gen-
erally. In addition, and given the extent of private and third sector
involvement in the delivery of public services, its ‘public services
industry’ is generally considered to be one of the largest and the
most developed in the world (Julius, 2008). Therefore the UK
experience offers interesting lessons for other economies with
similar agendas of privatisation and public sector reform.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the paper reviews
the literature that addresses the key conditions or mechanisms in the
procurement process that are seen to inﬂuence the effectiveness of
procurement in stimulating innovation. The paper seeks to investigate
how government suppliers perceive these aspects. We address this by
means of a survey of suppliers and we use a probit model to ascertain
the inﬂuence of structural, market and innovation variables on their
perception of those barriers. Section 3 explains the data, the variables,
and the approach for our econometric analysis. In Section 4 we
present the results and the ﬁnal section discusses the ﬁndings and
draws some conclusions and implications for policy.
2. Theoretical framework and key assumptions
2.1. Policy effort to boost public procurement of innovation – and
their limits
Public procurement refers to the acquisition of goods and
services by government or public sector organisations. Public
procurement is ﬁrst and foremost a vehicle allowing public sector
organisations to perform their functions and deliver key services
effectively. This notwithstanding, a growing body of scholars and
policy makers throughout the OECD have recognised that by
purchasing innovative products and solutions the public sector
can not only deliver services more effectively and efﬁciently but
also inﬂuence the innovation activities of private ﬁrms (The
Economist, 2010; OECD, 2011). Public procurement of innovation
has been associated with instances where public agencies act to
purchase, or place an order for, a product-service, good or system
that does not exist at the time but which could be developed
within a reasonable period; that is, that requires innovative work
to fulﬁl the demands of the buyer (Edquist and Hommen, 2000;
Edler et al., 2006). This contrasts with ‘regular procurement’,
where governments place orders for ‘off-the-shelf’ products.
A renewed interest in the use of public procurement to drive
innovation, and in so called demand-side innovation policies more
generally (Edler, 2010), has emerged as a result of a perception of a
relative failure of traditional, mainly supply-side, policies, to
improve innovation performance (OECD, 2011). In addition, the
rationales exercised for the use of public procurement have
broadened (including the pursuit of further societal outcomes
such as local employment or sustainability) (McCrudden, 2007), in
parallel with a change in the understanding of innovation (from an
R&D-centred, linear view to systemic approaches to innovation)
and a realisation of the potential of the public sector as an
innovator in its own right (Flanagan et al., 2011).
Initiatives to advance this policy agenda have proliferated in
recent years both in OECD countries and emerging economies
(Georghiou et al., 2010; Li, 2011; OECD, 2011; Uyarra, 2013;
Lember et al., 2013; Vecchiato and Roveda, 2014). Such initiatives
vary strongly in their rationales and implementation modes, a
reﬂection of national differences in the governance and structure
of public procurement, different objectives associated with this
policy across countries and policy sectors but also the inherent
complexity of procurement processes (Dimitri et al., 2006).
Georghiou et al. (2013) elaborate a policy framework and taxon-
omy of such interventions based on the functions supporting the
procurement of innovation and the deﬁciencies they seek to
remedy. Interventions may for instance address framework con-
ditions for procurement (legislation, governance frameworks),
organisational arrangements and capabilities for innovation pro-
curement, the identiﬁcation, speciﬁcation and signalling of needs,
and the provision of incentives for suppliers to take up innovative
solutions.
The UK has been particularly active in this area in the last
decade, introducing a host of initiatives and reforms in order to
mobilise the use of procurement to support competitiveness and
innovation (for a review see Uyarra et al., 2013). However, the
implementation of such strategies and initiatives has been
reported as being slow and fraught with difﬁculties. For instance,
the Ofﬁce for Government Commerce (OGC, 2004) noted that the
public sector was failing to fully ‘capture innovation’ through
procurement. In his review on creativity in business for HM
Treasury, George Cox argued that, despite much progress in
shifting the policy agenda, changing procurement practices
remained an important challenge, a difﬁculty compounded by
the fragmented nature of procurement in the UK (Cox, 2005). The
2008 ‘Innovation Nation’ White Paper similarly concluded that
“procuring innovative solutions has tended to be a low priority”
(DIUS, 2008: p.23; see also Heseltine, 2012).
Indeed, despite a generalised optimism regarding the potential
of procurement to stimulate commercial innovation, the chal-
lenges are considerable. This paper thus aims to better understand
what prevents suppliers from proposing innovative solutions.
A better acknowledgement of such barriers should facilitate an
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adapted and more differentiated policy response to make the
procurement of innovation more effective when and where it is
required.
2.2. Conditions for and barriers to capturing innovation through
public procurement
Metcalfe and Georghiou (1997) pinpoint four dimensions under-
pinning innovation in ﬁrms: the awareness of the set of innovation
opportunities, the capabilities to seize these opportunities, the set of
resources they can command to innovate, and the incentive struc-
tures rewarding innovation. Procurement can inﬂuence these dimen-
sions and thus encourage or hamper innovation in different ways, for
instance through aggregating contracts, setting standards, dealing
with intellectual property rights, engaging with suppliers to inform
speciﬁcations, or enabling a level playing ﬁeld through tendering
procedures (OFT, 2002; Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010). A number of
barriers can in turn prevent the public sector from ‘capturing
innovation’. These include inadequate early warning, lack of engage-
ment between procurers and suppliers, overly prescriptive and
burdensome procurement processes, risk aversion, and procurement
capability shortfalls (OGC, 2004; House of Lords, 2011). This section
discusses these barriers in detail and formulates some assumptions
as to their perception by different types of suppliers. These assump-
tions are the yardstick against which we analyse our data.
2.2.1. Procurement capabilities
In comparison with the procurement of off-the-shelf goods for
the lowest possible price, the procurement of innovation requires
a greater degree of in-house competence (Rothwell and Zegveld,
1981). A shortage of commercial skills among procurers has been
commonly found to limit engagement with the marketplace and
the development of closer supply relations. In a survey of public
procurers in small countries in Europe, Georghiou et al. (2010)
identiﬁed a lack of sufﬁcient procurement expertise for complex
purchases involving innovation as well as an absence of formal
training for procurers. In the UK, a review for the Cabinet Ofﬁce by
Green (2010) noted that commercial skills were very inconsistent
across central government. Considerable corporate capability con-
straints have been identiﬁed for English local authorities (Byatt,
2001). Skill constraints in turn signiﬁcantly hinder the adequate
use of potentially more ‘innovation-friendly’ procurement proce-
dures such as competitive dialogue (HM Treasury, 2010a). Indeed,
as the HM Treasury (2010:p.7) notes: “the outcome of a procure-
ment will be inﬂuenced as much by the capacity and capability of
those party to the process as by the nature of the contract to be
delivered”.
Particularly at lower levels of governance and in procurement
systems that are decentralised, there may be a shortage of
professional procurers and therefore the lack of skills for innova-
tive purchasing becomes an important challenge (Uyarra, 2010;
OECD, 2011). Our assumption is that suppliers to areas of the public
sector that are more fragmented, such as the National Health
Service (NHS) and local government, would be particularly con-
cerned about the capacity of procurers. Further, innovative ﬁrms
and ﬁrms with a stronger commitment to R&D would be more
sensitive to a perceived lack of expertise on the side of procurers
and see it as a strong barrier to supplying innovative goods or
services. We would also expect this barrier to be particularly acute
in the procurement of complex goods and services such as
construction related projects.
2.2.2. Management of risks associated with procuring innovations
Risk aversion of public agencies has also been identiﬁed as a
barrier to the procurement of innovation (HM Treasury, 2005;
DIUS, 2008). Decision making in the public sector is affected by
strong expectations regarding transparency and accountability
(Tsipouri et al., 2010). Accordingly, risk management in the public
sector entails “having in place a corporate and systematic process
for evaluating and addressing the impact of risks in a cost effective
way and having staff with the appropriate skills to identify and
assess the potential for risks to arise” (NAO, 2000: p.2). The
importance of risk management increases when the R&D itself is
part of the procurement (Tsipouri et al., 2010). Georghiou et al.
(2013) describe how some OECD countries have introduced
measures to reduce uncertainty or offset the perceived risks of
purchasing innovations, for instance through the provision of
ﬁnancial incentives, insurance guarantees and the use of quality
certiﬁcates.
In line with Tsipouri et al. (2010), our assumption is that how
risk is managed is a particularly important consideration for
suppliers that invest more in R&D. Procurers may be risk averse
and unwilling to take up new solutions and suppliers may be
reluctant to invest heavily in R&D and innovation activities if they
fear that they won’t get the necessary return.
2.2.3. Buyer–supplier interaction
OGC (2004) suggests the need for early interaction in procure-
ment in order to better ‘capture innovation’. Systems of innovation
approaches emphasise the interactive nature of innovation and in
particular the inﬂuence of users and user–producer interaction in
the production of innovations. Interaction in procurement can
create an environment of trust that reduces opportunism, the need
for costly monitoring and general transaction costs associated with
exchange in instances where there is information asymmetry
(Erridge and Nondi, 1994). Close and early engagement with
suppliers can also allow access to industry knowledge not avail-
able in-house that can be used to draw better tender speciﬁcations
(Uyarra, 2010). However, in procurement, interaction and commu-
nication between public buyers and potential suppliers can be
constrained by lack of skills, risk aversion or too rigid an applica-
tion of procurement procedures and practices (Erridge and Greer,
2002).
As mentioned in the introduction, public procurement has the
potential to bridge end users and potential suppliers, particularly
in those instances where procurement is conducted on behalf of
end users other than the procuring public agency or authority (e.g.
in services such as health or social care). However, interaction with
ﬁnal users is often hindered by lack of communication within
organisations between the procurement function and operational
or service areas that are closer to end users’ needs (Uyarra, 2010).
Centralised procurement functions within organisations and/or a
lack of cross-functional team working in procurement can thus
lead to a structural disconnect between potential suppliers, users
and buyers.
The need for communication is the more important the greater
the number of parties involved and the greater the need for user
engagement (Caldwell et al., 2009). We would therefore assume
that suppliers in the construction sector or health, or in personal
services such as social care, are more likely to perceive insufﬁcient
interaction as a barrier. It is also expected that a lack of interaction
would affect suppliers with different innovation proﬁles differ-
ently. We would thus expect it to be a concern for R&D intensive
organisations, and for organisations introducing service innova-
tions that rely on greater user interaction.
2.2.4. Public demand for innovation
The above discussion relates to the potential key role of the
public sector as ‘intelligent’ or ‘demanding’ client or customer.
Suppliers will adapt to the signals of public demand and respond
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with innovative solutions if they see the public sector as a
demanding customer (Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010). As Geroski
(1990: p.189) noted, “procurement policy is […] successful in
stimulating innovation when […] it leads to the expression of a
clear, consistent set of needs towards which innovative efforts can
be directed”. Lack of market demand has indeed been identiﬁed as
a key obstacle for innovation generally (Gallup, 2011), public
demand being especially important in sectors such as construc-
tion, transport or healthcare or in those instances where the public
sector is a ‘ﬁrst user’ of the innovation (Dalpé et al., 1992; Rothwell
and Zegveld, 1981). We therefore assume that the lack of public
sector demand for innovation is a stronger barrier for suppliers in
certain sectors and for suppliers with a stronger commitment to
R&D and product innovation, since early demand encourages
investment to enable such outcomes.
2.2.5. Tender speciﬁcations
The inﬂuence of procurement on innovation is also shaped by
the nature of tender speciﬁcations. Speciﬁcations phrased in
terms of outcomes or performance are considered to be better
at allowing industry to propose innovative solutions (Rothwell
and Zegveld, 1981; Geroski, 1990). Conversely, innovations may
be less likely when speciﬁcations are made too rigid and narrow.
Such rigidity prevents suppliers from proposing innovative ways
of delivering outcomes. While there is increasing awareness of
the importance of outcome speciﬁcations (and procurers are
increasingly incorporating them in their tenders), there is a range
of reasons why they are not used more comprehensively (see e.g.
the Byatt, 2001), such as general inertia and transaction cost of
change, and the additional requirements for tender evaluations,
including development of defendable evaluation criteria and
methodologies. As Edler et al. (2005) have shown, the extent to
which innovation can be supported through public procurement
depends on the formulation of functional speciﬁcations and the
availability of a variety of skills to evaluate tenders. Procurers
often fail to review or market test these speciﬁcations, not
questioning whether they may be stiﬂing innovation and raising
costs. This inertia constrains both innovation and opportunities
to achieve savings, as different and over-speciﬁed requirements
may co-exist for identical services and purposes (Uyarra, 2010).
In terms of differentiation by supplier types, we would expect
organisations that are more innovation active to be especially
sensible to such rigid speciﬁcations as they would perceive that
the public sector is unwilling to consider different, potentially
more innovative, solutions.
2.2.6. Incentives for the supply of innovative solutions
Even if the public sector demands innovation, incentives may
not be in place for that innovation to be realized. As Cabral et al.
(2006: p.485) note “the buyer must ensure that the suppliers
have enough incentives to invest in the innovative knowledge
that will eventually be incorporated in the goods it needs”. In
order to provide greater incentives to innovation, procurers may
decide to pool resources to provide bigger (or longer) contracts,
harmonise and standardise requirements, or aggregate demand
to exploit their purchasing power. By enlarging the market for
certain goods, the public sector can reduce uncertainty by
guaranteeing a certain return of investment associated with the
development of new products and processes. Contrariwise, frag-
mentation of public demand can limit potential scale effects and
thus discourage investment in innovation (Edquist and Hommen,
2000). This is particularly relevant in those industries charac-
terised by heavy R&D requirements and substantial economies of
scale in production (Porter, 1990). We would expect that con-
tracts that are perceived not to be substantial enough would be a
disincentive and therefore a barrier to innovation for those ﬁrms
that invest in R&D, for larger and more innovative ﬁrms, and in
sectors such as construction.
2.2.7. Management of IPR
In developed OECD economies, public procurement is embedded
within a clear set of IPR rules. However, IPR rules leave some
ﬂexibility as to how IP is allocated in different procurement
procedures. The way this is done inﬂuences the incentive structures
of suppliers within public procurement procedures. In many
instances, standard terms and conditions mandated by the govern-
ment do not contain any provisions covering intellectual property
ownership or licensing conditions (Wilkinson et al., 2005). In other
cases, the purchasing agency takes on full IPR ownership. The
European procurement directives allow the transfer of intellectual
property to the supplier, however this tends to be the exception
(Wilkinson et al., 2005). This notwithstanding, we assume that a
poor management of IPR would be perceived as a strong barrier by
certain suppliers, particularly those more committed to R&D and
innovation.
2.2.8. Access to tenders and other process related constraints
As it has become evident so far, the intentional use of public
procurement to promote innovation faces a number of challenges.
Additional difﬁculties associated with taking this agenda forward
include the ability of SMEs to access public sector contracts and
thus their potential to deliver innovative solutions (Glover, 2008).
Securing SME participation is particularly important when the
number of bidders is low and more competition needs to be
stimulated (Yukins and Piga, 2012). Constraints include regulatory
complexity, potential conﬂicts between policy objectives, a per-
ceived lack of a level playing ﬁeld, high entry costs or complex
procurement processes.
The structure of public tendering (particularly the use of large
bundled contracts, or selection criteria privileging size or experi-
ence) may reinforce incumbents’ advantages and lock SMEs out of
the market (Cabral et al., 2006). Breaking down tenders, either in
smaller contracts or geographically, can increase SME participation
(GHK, 2010). Other practices enabling access include the provision
of information, through e.g. web portals and other forms of
notiﬁcation, improving dialogue with SMEs and simplifying ten-
dering procedures (GHK, 2010).
An additional concern relates to the provision of good quality
feedback to unsuccessful businesses which could help improve
SME capacity (Glover, 2008). Suppliers, especially SMEs, may also
be negatively affected by fragmentation in the way procurement is
conducted and by a lack of consistency in how public sector needs
are transmitted to the market. Lack of consensus over priorities,
inconsistent deﬁnition of needs, or even frequent changes in policy
would have the effect of increasing uncertainty and decreasing
the likelihood of innovation (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1981; Uyarra,
2010).
Associated concerns include a lack of openness on the part of
the public sector to receive and take on board unsolicited ideas
from suppliers and a lack of appreciation by procurers of suppliers
past performance, particularly in relation to the successful delivery
of innovative goods and services to the private sector. Public sector
procurers may fail to appreciate previous innovations serving
private markets, which could be incorporated and/or adapted into
the public sector realm. This lack of spillovers between the private
and private sector may diminish the potential catalytic effect of
procurement on innovation.
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3. Methodology and data sources
This paper draws from a dedicated survey of suppliers to public
sector organisations in the UK. The survey was conducted using
computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) by the UK survey
company Harris Interactive during May and July 2011 and
addressed general managers or heads of public sector contracts
and addressed general company managers or heads of public
sector contracts. The ‘order effect’ on responses is minimised by
allowing randomisation of answer choices.
The focus of the survey was to understand the elements that act
as barriers and drivers to stimulating innovation in the procurement
process. The survey asked for information on a wide range of issues
related to the innovation activities of supplier ﬁrms, the types of
procurement they are engaged in, as well as general perceptions on
the main practices and competences of procuring organisations,
including perceived barriers to innovation.
By public sector organisations, we mean UK central government
departments, local government and NHS in England, which consti-
tute the lion's share (around 90 per cent) of public procurement
spending in the UK (HM Treasury, 2010b). In order to identify a
sampling frame of organisations that had supplied to the public
sector, we used publicly available information on government con-
tracts during 2010. This included suppliers to the NHS in 5 of the
9 English NHS regions, 93 Local authorities in England, and 97
department entities belonging to all of the 25 central government
departments in the UK. Only ‘core suppliers’, or organisations whose
aggregated annual contracting with the public sector was above a set
threshold of d50,000 in the 2010 ﬁnancial year were considered.
Procurement (particularly at the local level) is characterised by a
concentration of a high proportion of spend by relatively few ﬁrms,
while there is a fairly long “tail” in the distribution of businesses that
have quite small contracts by value (Peck and Cabras, 2011).
Names of suppliers were then matched with commercial
databases (FAME and Companies House) to obtain the details of
8214 organisations. A ﬁrst round of contacts led to the exclusion of
1619 invalid entries from the sample. Of the remaining organisa-
tions, 2724 were not accessible, leaving an effective sample of
4343 organisations. By July 2011 800 full interviews had been
conducted, which represents approximately 10 per cent of the
original sample, or 20 per cent when considering the effective
sample. Our respondents were either general managers or heads
of public sector contracts.
Since there is no commonly agreed deﬁnition of the public
services industry in the UK (Julius, 2008), we are unable to test
how representative our sample is of the total population of public
sector suppliers. However we found no statistically signiﬁcant
differences in the number of responses and in the number of
refusals by sector of activity, or by areas of government. This said,
the survey cannot claim to represent the overall population of
organisations supplying to the UK public sector.
The organisations that provide goods and services to the public
sector make up a heterogeneous sector, comprising commercial,
third sector and publicly owned bodies (Julius, 2008). Further-
more, it is important to note that organisations supplying goods
and services to the public sector often serve both government and
private sector markets, so the public sector may be a relatively
large or a relatively small inﬂuence on their innovation activities.
Naturally this would vary across sectors and supply markets.
Reﬂecting this heterogeneity, the sample contains organisations
with different degrees of contracting with the public vis-à-vis
private sector, private ﬁrms and voluntary organisations, large and
small organisations, and suppliers in manufacturing as well as in
service sector industries (see Table 2).
Given the way the sampling frame has been constructed, one
potential outcome is the likely under-surveying of the smallest
organisations (although micro enterprises are still 10 per cent of
the sample). Under representation of micro sized ﬁrms is a
common concern in studies of ﬁrm level innovation processes,
leading to a potential over-estimate of population levels of
innovation, and investment in R&D (Freel and Robson, 2004).
This however should not compromise the usefulness of our
ﬁndings.
3.1. Variables description and model
3.1.1. Dependent variables
We are interested in procurement related factors that supplier
organisations perceive as barriers to innovation. Our ﬁrst set of
dependent variable(s) are extracted from a question where sup-
pliers were asked, from a list of procurement related issues, if they
experienced any of them as barriers to innovation and how
intensely. The dependent variables were translated into dichot-
omous values to indicate the importance attached by the supply-
ing organisation to each type of barrier to innovation. Each
variable takes a value of one if that particular feature is perceived
as a barrier (either very signiﬁcantly or moderately signiﬁcantly)
and zero otherwise. Our second set of dependent variables stem
from a question where respondents were asked to agree to a
number of statements related to the procurement process and take
a value of 1 if they agree and 0 if not. The original question and the
responses are shown in Figs. 1 and 2 below.
Each set of dependent variables are analysed separately. We use
techniques for binary outcomes, that is, probit regression models.
In the ﬁrst step, we analyse univariate probit models, separately
for all dependent variables. In the second step, to capture the
possible interdependence of the barriers we employ a multivariate
probit model. The multivariate probit model generalises the
bivariate probit model, which is a natural extension of the probit
model that allows more than one equation with correlated
disturbances. Then, disturbances across equations are allowed to
Fig. 1. Question: “Have you experienced any of the following as barriers to innovation?”
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be freely correlated. Each individual equation is a standard
probit model.
3.1.2. Independent variables
Given the sectoral variation in terms of technological sources
and opportunities which impinge upon innovation performance
(Pavitt, 1984), analysis of innovation activities must, in principle,
control for sectors. Standard industrial classiﬁcation categories are
however less appropriate to capture sectoral variety in public
procurement, given the speciﬁc nature of the government service
market and the greater weight of certain service sectors (Atkinson,
2005). The government services market is generally characterised
according to activities such as professional services, facilities
management, construction services, IT services and products, and
professional services (DCLG/PwC, 2006; Julius, 2008). We follow a
similar approach in this study and differentiate between facilities
management, professional services, social services, suppliers of IT
& ofﬁce equipment, healthcare supplies and services, and works.
In order to understand sectoral variation, dummies for the
different (self-reported) supply markets are therefore created.
Variables are also included to account for the size of organisa-
tions and innovation characteristics. Within the latter we intro-
duce dummy variables to distinguish whether suppliers have
introduced a product innovation that is ‘new to the market’, a
service innovation that is ‘new to the market’ and whether the
organisation has invested in R&D in the last three years. As
innovation measures, we choose ‘new to the market’ products
and services to better reﬂect our working deﬁnition of public
procurement of innovation as the ‘purchase of a product-service,
good or system that does not exist’.
Variables are also included in order to account for different
areas of the public sector. Procurement of social services is mainly
concentrated in local government, whilst procurement of health-
care equipment, supplies and services is mostly responsibility
of the NHS. Central government departments procure a greater
diversity of goods and services. We have therefore created
a dummy to indicate whether the main customer is central
government.
Third sector organisations are increasingly encouraged to take a
greater role in public sector delivery, yet they face speciﬁc barriers
when tendering for public contracts, including the short-term
nature of contracts and competitive tendering and decision-
making procedures (Home Ofﬁce and OGC, 2004). Most third
sector organisations are also suppliers of social services, so we
have included a dummy variable for the former but not for the
latter to prevent multicollinearity.
Table 1 presents information on the variables used in the
analysis.
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2 and the
correlation matrixes are presented in Tables A3 and A4 in the
Appendix. Correlations are generally low to moderate, which
indicates that there is a low risk of collinearity.
In order to better understand and contextualise these barriers,
additional information has been extracted from an open ended
question included at the end of the survey, which gave the
respondents an opportunity to add further considerations, clar-
iﬁcations and/or recommendations. These responses are used to
corroborate, contextualise or provide a new angle to the analysis.
These responses, though helpful to contextualise results, need to
be taken with some caution as these may be biased in the light of
the questions that precede them.
4. Discussion
The main barriers reported by ﬁrms refer to the lack of
interaction with procuring organisations, the use of over-
speciﬁed tenders as opposed to outcome based speciﬁcations,
low competences of procurers and a poor management of risk.
Additional key concerns include (lack of) feedback from unsuc-
cessful bids, a low appreciation of unsolicited ideas and previous
private sector delivery history, and the difﬁculties for participation
posed by pre-qualiﬁcation procedures and conditions.
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the univariate probit models.
Table 3 contains the eight equations estimating the eight barriers
to innovation. Table 4 shows the results for the probit models
estimating the additional seven process-related barriers. Tables A1
and A2 in the Appendix in turn show the results of the multi-
variate probit models that we conduct to improve the robustness
of the results and test for complementarities between the depen-
dent variables. The results of both sets of models are largely
consistent.
As elaborated below, we ﬁnd evidence of the relative relevance
of certain ﬁrm, sector and innovation related characteristics on the
perception of these barriers.
4.1. Firm characteristics
As expected, ﬁrms of different sizes have different perceptions
of barriers in relation to the inﬂuence that size of contracts have
on innovation. Larger ﬁrms are particularly sensitive to contract
size. Indeed, and as noted in the literature, too small or too short
public contracts may act as a strong disincentive to innovation.
Demand may in this case not be sufﬁciently large to pull innova-
tion (let alone encourage them to participate in the tender). How
risk is managed is also perceived strongly as a barrier by larger
ﬁrms.
By contrast, the smaller the ﬁrms the greater the difﬁculty large
contracts pose for their participation in tenders. Size is also related
to whether information about tender opportunities is perceived to
be sufﬁcient. Smaller ﬁrms are also particularly concerned about
the variable quality of feedback or lack thereof. As one respondent
Fig. 2. Question: “Do you agree with any of the following statements?”.
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put it: “Some [feedback is] really good, some very bad. Doesn’t
help for next bid.”
As expected, smaller ﬁrms feel that pre-qualiﬁcation proce-
dures and/or conditions discourage them from participating in
tenders (see Table 4). As one supplier noted: “We have to provide
the same information in a different format – this is a waste of time
at the pre-qualiﬁcation stage”. Another supplier shared the same
sentiment by stating: “The whole process is time consuming,
completely ridiculous and puts pressure on small businesses.”
Social enterprises have speciﬁc concerns. Prior studies have
noted the uncertainty faced by third sector suppliers when
competing in the procurement market (Cloutier-Fisher and Skin-
ner, 2006). For instance one supplier noted: “We always had
experience in the tradition of ‘Grant Aid’. So making the transition
to the structure of full public sector bidding is a huge culture
change and shock which requires a lot of changes and learning on
our part”.
In particular, our results show that too short contracts are a very
signiﬁcant barrier for these suppliers, while at the same time large
bundled contracts are a barrier to entry (see Table 4). It is
important to note however that short contracts are in these cases
not just a barrier to innovation but more generally a threat to the
survival of these organisations. The following quote illustrates the
precarious ﬁnancial position facing some charitable organisations:
“If the contracts were awarded for 3 years a lot of us (voluntary
sector) wouldn’t have to sit on reserves to have 6 months running
costs in case of contracts ending.”
Regression results also suggest that, controlling for other
things, suppliers that belong to the voluntary sector are also
affected by rigid speciﬁcations. One supplier for instance noted:
“The bidding process should reﬂect the outcomes relating to
people rather than price”. Some innovative social enterprises
lament that the public sector does not acknowledge or appreciate
the “added value of the voluntary sector” and, consequently, their
potential to innovate and take risks. Another organisation posited
that “our quality of service must stay high because of our ethos”.
The public sector is hardly a coherent whole. Rather, as one
respondent put it, “knowledge and appetite for innovation differs
vastly across different [government] sectors”. Social enterprises in
particular are concerned about the lack of consistency in procure-
ment across the public sector (as one of them put it, “what is good
in one sector (e.g. NHS) is poor in others and vice versa”) and
consider that “public sector clients need to share knowledge and
experience better”. Organisations that mainly serve central gov-
ernment departments complain about the lack of demand for
innovation, the small size of contracts and the way risk and IPR are
Table 1
Variables' description.
Variable Type Construction
Dependent variables – Innovation barriers
Lack of demand for
innovation
Binary 1 if lack of demand for innovation is considered a very signiﬁcant or a moderately signiﬁcant barrier, and 0 otherwise
Speciﬁcations too
prescriptive
Binary 1 if speciﬁcations being too prescriptive is considered a very signiﬁcant or a moderately signiﬁcant barrier, and 0 otherwise
Contracts not big enough Binary 1 if not large enough contracts are considered a very signiﬁcant or a moderately signiﬁcant barrier, and 0 otherwise
Contracts not long enough Binary 1 if not long enough contracts are considered a very signiﬁcant or a moderately signiﬁcant barrier, and 0 otherwise
Lack of interaction Binary 1 if lack of interaction with procuring organisations is considered a very signiﬁcant or a moderately signiﬁcant barrier, and
0 otherwise
Low capabilities of procurers Binary 1 if procurers capabilities are considered a very signiﬁcant or a moderately signiﬁcant barrier, and 0 otherwise
Inadequate management of
IPR
Binary 1 if inadequate management of IPR is considered very signiﬁcant or a moderately signiﬁcant barrier, and 0 otherwise
Poor management of risk Binary 1 if poor risk management is considered a very signiﬁcant or a moderately signiﬁcant barrier, and 0 otherwise
Dependent variables – Procurement process-related barriers
Consistent procurement Binary Based on the statement “Different parts of the public sector procure similar products and services consistently” 1 if the
respondents strongly or moderately agrees, 0 otherwise
Large contracts participation Binary Based on the statement “Larger contracts make it difﬁcult for us to participate in tenders” 1 if the respondents strongly or
moderately agrees, 0 otherwise
Sufﬁcient information
tenders
Binary Based on the statement “There is sufﬁcient information available about tender opportunities” 1 if the respondents strongly or
moderately agrees, 0 otherwise
Useful feedback Binary Based on the statement “When unsuccessful in a bid, we tend to receive useful feedback” 1 if the respondents strongly or
moderately agrees, 0 otherwise
Unsolicited ideas Binary Based on the statement “The public sector is generally open to unsolicited ideas from the market” 1 if the respondents
strongly or moderately agrees, 0 otherwise
Private sector delivery
history
Binary Based on the statement “Public bodies sufﬁciently recognise private sector delivery history when assessing bids” 1 if the
respondents strongly or moderately agrees, 0 otherwise
PQ conditions Binary Based on the statement “Pre-qualiﬁcation conditions discourage us from participating in tenders” 1 if the respondents
strongly or moderately agrees, 0 otherwise
Explanatory variables
Size Categorical 1 if the organisation has between 1 and 10 employees; 2 if it has between 11 and 50 employees; 3 if it has between 51 and
250 employees; 4 if it has more than 250 employees
Social enterprise Binary 1 if the organisation is a non-for-proﬁt organisation, 0 otherwise
Facilities mgmt. services Binary 1, if the main category of goods and services supplied are ‘Facilities management services’, 0 otherwise
Healthcare Binary 1, if the main category of goods and services supplied are ‘healthcare’, 0 otherwise
IT & ofﬁce equipment Binary 1, if the main category of goods and services supplied are ‘IT & ofﬁce equipment’, 0 otherwise
Works Binary 1, if the main category of goods and services supplied are ‘works’, 0 otherwise
Professional services Binary 1, if the main category of goods and services supplied are ‘professional services’, 0 otherwise
Central government Binary 1, if the main public sector client is central government, 0 otherwise
R&D Binary 1, if the ﬁrm had any R&D activities between 2008 and 2010
New to the market product
innovation
Binary 1, if the ﬁrm had introduced any new to the market product innovation between 2008 and 2010
New to the market service
innovation
Binary 1, if the ﬁrm had any R&D activities between 2008 and 2010
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managed. Our assumption that suppliers in more fragmented local
government and NHS markets are more sensitive to innovation
related barriers is therefore not conﬁrmed.
4.2. Market characteristics
In relation to market category, we do not ﬁnd strong differ-
ences in the perception of barriers across sectors except for a few
supply markets. In particular, organisations supplying goods and
services related to works (construction and other services related
to the built environment) show a range of concerns. As expected
given the relative complexity of the goods and services provided,
insufﬁcient demand size acts a strong disincentive to innovation in
the sector. Too rigid speciﬁcations and, albeit less signiﬁcantly, the
quality of public demand, poor procurement capabilities and
risk management practices are also perceived to be barriers to
innovation.
Perceptions also differ across sectors in relation to the coher-
ence and consistency of procurement across the public sector. Only
suppliers of facilities management services tend to agree that
“different parts of the public sector procure similar products and
services consistently”. Equally, suppliers in construction admit that
the public sector recognises private sector delivery history and
that feedback tends to be useful. This reﬂects the dual market
(both private and public) nature of such services and a greater
professionalisation of procurement processes in construction in
the UK (as reﬂected in sector- speciﬁc tendering portals, frame-
works and simpliﬁed pre-qualiﬁcation procedures), although
bureaucratic purchasing processes may also be associated with
perceived barriers such as low demand for innovation and rigid
speciﬁcations as mentioned above.
4.3. Innovation characteristics
The literature has stressed the inﬂuence of certain procurement
related practices, particularly around contract size, management of
IPR and capability shortages, on R&D and innovation. These are
corroborated by our ﬁndings. We ﬁnd support for our assumptions
that suppliers that undertake R&D activities are more likely to
perceive issues such as lack of demand for innovation, size of
contracts, rigid speciﬁcations, lack of capacities and lack of risk
management as barriers to innovation.
In relation to a lack of demand for innovation, a number of R&D
intensive suppliers complained that, despite the widespread
rhetoric on innovation and procurement, these intentions are not
reﬂected in processes and procedures. This is illustrated by com-
ments such as “the public sector wants to hear about innovation
but it won’t take on innovative practices”, or “for all they ask about
innovation they don’t want it”, or simply “there is not the desire
for innovation in public sector procurement”.
Related barriers perceived by suppliers conducting R&D include
rigid speciﬁcations and lack of competences. For instance one
respondent noted: “we often ﬁnd ourselves in situations where
the procuring body may be open to innovations but there isn’t
time or opportunity to secure a departure from that speciﬁcation.”
The use of rigid speciﬁcations is closely linked with a perceived
lack of competences. A supplier thus highlighted that “the
majority [of procurers] are ‘old school’ who are either afraid
of, or incapable of understanding the beneﬁts of commercial
innovation.”
According to suppliers, procedures that are too rigid are linked
to a one-size-ﬁts-all approach, whereby procurers “apply the
standard generic procurement criteria and process to all procure-
ment projects regardless of the procurement type whether that be
a paper clip or the procurement of large specialist ﬂeet.”
Lack of skills is related to the likelihood and quality of buyer–
supplier interaction, also perceived as a barrier by organisations
carrying out R&D. One of them emphasised that “as a bidder, you
need this dialogue to innovate effectively.” This is in turn related to
the strong perception among these suppliers that the public sector
is not open to unsolicited ideas from the market (see Table 4).
Management of IPR is also a signiﬁcant barrier for ﬁrms conduct-
ing R&D, indeed one supplier questioned the government requir-
ing the ownership of the IPR: “why not give the IPR to the party
which will exploit them?”
We ﬁnd mixed support for our assumption about the inﬂuence
of certain barriers on organisations that are innovation active.
Organisations that have introduced service innovations (new to
the market services) are strongly associated with barriers related
to contract size, lack of interaction, poor procurement capabilities
and management of intellectual property rights in procurement.
One such supplier for instance lamented that “there is no direct
communication between the bidder and the ‘user’, all is via the
restrictive interface that is the procurer. This results in poor
speciﬁcation and ineffective procurement. If you are going to drive
innovation you need that ‘face to face’ dialogue to get under the
skin of the user”. This reﬂects the structural disconnect mentioned
in Section 2 between potential providers, users and buyers. In the
case of organisations that have introduced product innovations the
results are quite different. In this case, suppliers that have not
introduced any new to the market products are more likely to
report demand, interaction and capability constraints as barriers
for innovation.
These results may be explained by the different nature of the
markets these suppliers are serving. Meeting public sector
demand for certain services is likely to require innovation in the
way these are delivered. Social services or professional services are
inherently more customised or user oriented, so innovation may
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Categories Frequency
Size (No. of employees)
Less than 10 10.3
Between 10 and 49 37.1
Between 50 and 250 28.2
More than 250 23.8
Type of organisation
Private 81
Social enterprise 17
Main categories of goods and services supplied
Facilities mgmt. services 11.4
Healthcare equipment, supplies and services (inc. dental &
optical)
14.5
IT & ofﬁce equipment 7.6
Professional services 19.9
Social community care, supplies & services 16.6
Works 18.1
Main client
Local government 23.9
NHS 52.6
Central government 17.1
Innovation
R&D 65.4
New2market product innov 45.25
New2market service innov 53.38
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still take place despite the perceived barriers. In other markets
however, suppliers may be able to respond to public sector
demand with standard products without the need for innovation.
Thus results may be strongly inﬂuenced by the nature of the
supply markets in terms of the relative importance of public
demand and their associated service vis-à-vis product innovations,
besides the use or not of ‘innovation-friendly’ public procurement
practices.
If suppliers are supplying standard, ‘off-the-shelf’ goods rather
than new products, this may indicate, at best, that the public
sector may be responsive to existing innovations but less likely to
trigger innovations. At worst, it may indicate a dominance of cost
related versus quality related considerations when awarding
tenders. Other questions of the survey may provide some addi-
tional clues. Organisations that innovate in products are less
likely to be inﬂuenced by the public sector in their innovation
activities when compared with their service innovation counter-
parts. Indeed, around 62 per cent of new to the market product
innovators recognised an inﬂuence of public procurement on
their innovations whereas for service innovators this was the
case for 75 per cent. Product innovators are also more likely to be
larger ﬁrms serving global as well as domestic markets. As stated
by one large product innovating ﬁrm “Our group's market is
global, so innovation is driven on global scale as opposed to
domestic UK.”
Although these results merit more investigation, we could
venture to suggest that the public sector may be failing to capture
innovation from organisations that are innovative and that could
either increase their R&D investment, their rate of innovations or
supply more of their innovations to the public sector. Equally, it is
likely that a lot of potentially innovative suppliers are driven away
from the public sector market either by a perceived lack of
competence or lack of demand for innovation, or because they
are unable to access it given cost related and other process related
barriers.
5. Conclusion and policy implications
The aim of this paper was to shed light on the barriers related
to processes, competences, procedures and relationships in public
procurement that inﬂuence suppliers’ ability to innovate and to
reap the beneﬁts of innovation. Contrary to previous studies that
sought to assess the innovation impact of public procurement vis-
à-vis other policy instruments, we were able to look at several
aspects in public procurement that are thought to constrain
innovation.
We used a multivariate probit model to take into account the
complementarities between the different barriers and concerns, as
ﬁrms may simultaneously experience them. Our analysis tested
Table 3
Univariate probit. Barriers to innovation.
Variables Lack of demand for
innovation (1)
Speciﬁcations too
prescriptive (2)
Contracts not big
enough (3)
Contracts not
long enough (4)
Lack of
interaction
(5)
Low capabilities of
procurers (6)
Inadequate
mgmt of IPR (7)
Poor mgmt
of risk (8)
Size 0.053 0.045 0.207nnn 0.149nnn 0.098n 0.031 0.009 0.203nnn
(0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.054) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052)
Facilities mgmt.
services
0.613nnn 0.073 0.189 0.033 0.201 0.193 0.330n 0.125
(0.177) (0.172) (0.169) (0.171) (0.185) (0.171) (0.172) (0.174)
Healthcare 0.150 0.081 0.069 0.011 0.096 0.121 0.191 0.122
(0.157) (0.161) (0.158) (0.160) (0.169) (0.159) (0.165) (0.161)
IT & ofﬁce
equipment
0.022 0.066 0.165 0.108 0.135 0.033 0.423nn 0.173
(0.195) (0.198) (0.199) (0.197) (0.204) (0.198) (0.200) (0.201)
Works 0.323nn 0.430nnn 0.377nn 0.004 0.162 0.287n 0.215 0.372nn
(0.152) (0.157) (0.153) (0.152) (0.165) (0.156) (0.157) (0.163)
Professional
services
0.055 0.280n 0.157 0.006 0.174 0.108 0.314nn 0.057
(0.142) (0.148) (0.142) (0.143) (0.155) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145)
R&D 0.313nnn 0.321nnn 0.297nnn 0.033 0.345nnn 0.349nnn 0.275nn 0.283nnn
(0.105) (0.106) (0.104) (0.104) (0.110) (0.105) (0.108) (0.106)
New2market
product
innov
0.203nn 0.118 0.204nn 0.190n 0.201n 0.190n 0.030 0.128
(0.098) (0.101) (0.098) (0.098) (0.106) (0.099) (0.099) (0.102)
New2market
service innov
0.031 0.046 0.171n 0.202nn 0.222nn 0.220nn 0.223nn 0.119
(0.096) (0.097) (0.095) (0.096) (0.103) (0.096) (0.098) (0.097)
Central
government
0.266nn 0.150 0.249nn 0.163 0.108 0.221n 0.320nn 0.350nn
(0.130) (0.135) (0.126) (0.129) (0.137) (0.131) (0.125) (0.138)
Social
enterprise
0.126 0.276n 0.027 0.693nnn 0.087 0.035 0.066 0.154
(0.136) (0.145) (0.137) (0.147) (0.151) (0.141) (0.140) (0.144)
Constant 0.156 0.062 1.011nnn 0.427nn 0.107 0.133 1.001nnn 0.461nnn
(0.173) (0.177) (0.178) (0.173) (0.181) (0.174) (0.182) (0.178)
Log likelihood 507.24 483.13 515.60 511.69 432.68 500.37 482.77 483.89
McKelvey and
Zavoina's R2
0.08 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.12
Observations: 787. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
nnn po0.01.
nn po0.05.
n po0.10.
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the inﬂuence of different types of variables on what the literature
associates with key challenges for the procurement of innovation.
To the best of our knowledge, this has not been done before. In
particular, we tested the impact of different ﬁrm, market and
innovation characteristics of suppliers on the dependent variables.
We also considered other organisational and governance
aspects inﬂuencing procurement in general and participation of
SMEs in particular and, in order to contextualise the results, we
complemented these results with speciﬁc insights from supplier
organisations.
The main barriers reported by ﬁrms were a lack of interaction
with procuring organisations, the use of rigid as opposed to
outcome-based speciﬁcations, low competences of procurers and
a poor management of risk. Additional key concerns expressed by
suppliers included poor feedback, a low appreciation of unsolicited
ideas and previous private sector delivery history, and cumber-
some pre-qualiﬁcation procedures and conditions.
We ﬁnd conﬁrmation that skills and capacity shortages, and
related aspect of risk management are seen as problematic by
suppliers of construction related services, R&D intensive organisa-
tions and larger suppliers. We also ﬁnd evidence that small
contract size is a disincentive to innovation in large and in R&D
intensive organisations. The latter are also affected by a perceived
lack of demand for innovation, something that suppliers of
facilities management and construction related services also
experience. Finally, user engagement is an issue for R&D intensive
and for service innovating suppliers.
Thus one key ﬁnding is that, while being pervasive, many
barriers are speciﬁc to different product markets. Different sup-
pliers in different sectors and in different parts of the public sector
have different perceptions as to whether the public sector is a
demanding and intelligent customer.
Our results also suggest that certain organisations encounter
greater difﬁculties arising from the procurement process. Indeed,
particular types of suppliers appear to be at a disadvantage by
virtue of their size or non-proﬁt orientation. SMEs, and more
speciﬁcally micro and small ﬁrms, perceive certain procurement
practices as disadvantageous, particularly the size of contracts, the
lack of useful feedback and the pre-qualiﬁcation requirements.
Policy measures trying to ease SME access to public tenders,
simplifying procedures, using lots, and promoting better informa-
tion on contracts thus appear justiﬁed, for small ﬁrms clearly
compete on unequal terms. Equally, suppliers in the voluntary
sector feel at a disadvantage by contracts that are perceived to be
too large and at the same time not long enough for them to
innovate. They are also sensitive to inconsistent requirements and
conditions across the public sector and speciﬁcations that are
often too rigid to unleash innovation in this sector. There is a
perception among the surveyed voluntary organisations that their
particular idiosyncrasies and their innovation potential (see
Nugroho, 2011) are not being sufﬁciently recognised.
The main and most consistent result of the analysis concerns
the perception of barriers among suppliers undertaking R&D.
We ﬁnd support for our assumptions that ﬁrms with stronger
Table 4
Univariate probit. Procurement process-related barriers.
Variables Consistent
procurement (1)
Large contracts hinder
participation (2)
Sufﬁcient info
tenders (3)
Useful
feedback (4)
Unsolicited
ideas (5)
Private sector delivery
history (6)
PQ
conditions
(7)
Size 0.011 0.324nnn 0.249nnn 0.135nn 0.071 0.089n 0.240nnn
(0.052) (0.053) (0.051) (0.059) (0.066) (0.054) (0.053)
Facilities mgmt.
services
0.400nn 0.175 0.106 0.011 0.246 0.093 0.181
(0.168) (0.178) (0.166) (0.205) (0.231) (0.187) (0.180)
Healthcare 0.077 0.113 0.031 0.153 0.371n 0.048 0.179
(0.162) (0.169) (0.159) (0.193) (0.221) (0.179) (0.172)
IT & ofﬁce
equipment
0.044 0.087 0.121 0.325 0.351 0.092 0.018
(0.207) (0.205) (0.201) (0.223) (0.274) (0.221) (0.210)
Works 0.197 0.272n 0.147 0.383nn 0.410nn 0.388nn 0.078
(0.157) (0.155) (0.149) (0.176) (0.204) (0.164) (0.156)
Professional
services
0.069 0.090 0.006 0.228 0.444nn 0.133 0.081
(0.145) (0.147) (0.141) (0.166) (0.202) (0.156) (0.148)
R&D 0.046 0.148 0.088 0.172 0.260n 0.026 0.188n
(0.110) (0.106) (0.105) (0.123) (0.145) (0.116) (0.106)
Central government 0.120 0.118 0.151 0.032 0.170 0.144 0.106
(0.127) (0.134) (0.126) (0.135) (0.179) (0.137) (0.135)
New2market
product innov
0.018 0.034 0.053 0.103 0.083 0.034 0.023
(0.102) (0.102) (0.097) (0.110) (0.135) (0.108) (0.102)
New2market
service innov
0.107 0.142 0.166n 0.134 0.260nn 0.044 0.118
(0.099) (0.099) (0.095) (0.108) (0.132) (0.104) (0.099)
Social enterprise 0.318nn 0.517nnn 0.072 0.111 0.218 0.259n 0.127
(0.144) (0.139) (0.137) (0.160) (0.193) (0.150) (0.148)
Constant 0.289 0.425nn 0.878nnn 1.490nnn 1.327nnn 1.081nnn 0.339n
(0.178) (0.178) (0.175) (0.216) (0.243) (0.192) (0.181)
Log likelihood 478.75 470.30 521.03 377.59 272.54 415.87 461.51
McKelvey and
Zavoina's R2
0.05 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.09
Observations: 782. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
nnn po0.01.
nn po0.05.
n po0.10.
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commitment to R&D, controlling for other factors, are more likely
to perceive issues such as lack of demand for innovation, size of
contracts, lack of capacities, rigid speciﬁcations and lack of risk
management as important barriers to innovation in the context of
public procurement. Since we lack data on relative R&D efforts of
suppliers we are unable provide more reﬁned results.
Moreover, our results reveal a different perception between
product and service innovation. This may be related to an over-
representation of service sector activities in the sample and reﬂect
the nature of innovation dynamics underpinning different public
sector markets. It may also suggest that the public sector is less
likely to trigger new product innovations and instead tends to
adopt existing products in a responsive way.
In the light of these ﬁndings it may plausibly be concluded that
the public sector is missing out on fully capturing innovation
through procurement. The identiﬁed barriers may be preventing
ﬁrms from increasing their commitment to R&D and their rate of
(particularly product) innovations. Equally, it could be argued that
innovative companies do not see the public sector as an intelligent
customer and thus fail to exploit their full innovation potential. At
the same time there is a danger that small ﬁrms are not able to get
into contracts that would help them innovate.
These results are of high policy relevance. Recent initiatives in
the UK directed at improving capacity, simplifying procedures,
channelling feedback and concerns of SMEs (via e.g. the Mystery
Shopper Scheme), and improving consistency in public tendering,
can be assessed favourably in the light of these ﬁndings. Initiatives
directed at centralising and streamlining procurement, while
positive from the point of view of avoiding duplication and
increasing efﬁciency, will need to be carefully designed not to
further drive away small innovative suppliers and not to further
disconnect suppliers from ﬁnal users. These considerations not-
withstanding, it is nevertheless surprising that the government
have sought to mandate many of these changes only in central
government and not in other parts of the public sector. As noted by
the House of Lords (2011): 42, this “laissez faire approach to the
dissemination of best practice in procurement from central to local
government appears to be overly optimistic”. Furthermore, and
given the anxieties expressed by suppliers in relation to the lack of
demand for innovation, concerns can also be raised in terms of
what appears to be a diminished role for innovation vis-a-vis
efﬁciency related considerations in government procurement in
the UK (House of Lords, 2011; Uyarra, 2013).
These considerations are particularly pertinent in the current
economic crisis. As a consequence of the economic downturn,
government efforts to ‘capture innovation’ through procurement
are likely to diminish even further. For instance a supplier argued:
“I think they’ve gone backwards. Best value when ﬁrst came out
was a good driver for innovation and has been forgotten about in
the last couple of years with economic downturn”. If true, it is
short-sighted for government to pursue lowest price off-the-shelf
solutions only to pay more not only over the life cycle of the
purchase but also to cut itself off from the potential to transform
cost and service quality through innovation.
Nevertheless, this study has some limitations. Firstly, because
of the sampling strategy, the survey may not be an accurate
reﬂection of the whole UK public sector, both in terms of func-
tional areas and geographically. Secondly, it does not consider the
view of organisations trying to access public sector markets and
not succeeding. We suspect there is a pool of innovative organisa-
tions unable or unwilling to bid for public sector contracts because
of the aforementioned barriers, however their views are not
reﬂected here. Finally, our analysis is focused only on the UK
which limits the extent to which ﬁndings and lessons can be
generalised. It would be interesting to extend our empirical results
to other countries also seeking to orient procurement budgets
towards innovation.
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Table A1
Multivariate probit. Barriers to innovation.
Variables Lack of demand for
innovation (1)
Speciﬁcations too
prescriptive (2)
Contracts not big
enough (3)
Contracts not long
enough (4)
Lack of interaction (5) Low capabilities of
procurers (6)
Inadequate mgmt of IPR
(7)
Poor mgmt of risk
(8)
Size 0.0465 0.0454 0.2081nnn 0.1398nnn 0.1021n 0.0313 0.0112 0.1934nnn
(0.0503) (0.0512) (0.0502) (0.0503) (0.0529) (0.0506) (0.0510) 0.0511
Facilities mgmt.
services
0.5990nnn 0.0819 0.2065 0.0062 0.1932 0.1870 0.3413n 0.1205
(0.1723) (0.1674) (0.1693) (0.1728) (0.1801) (0.1677) (0.1697) 0.1711
Healthcare 0.1472 0.0908 0.0792 0.0361 0.0329 0.1669 0.2333 0.0818
(0.1524) (0.1582) (0.1573) (0.1618) (0.1694) (0.1591) (0.1684) 0.1607
IT & ofﬁce
equipment
0.0026 0.0431 0.2232 0.1363 0.1018 0.0251 0.4009nn 0.1663
(0.2057) (0.2019) (0.2123) (0.2100) (0.2145) (0.2067) (0.2115) 0.2097
Works 0.3145nn 0.4554nnn 0.3975nn 0.0621 0.2004 0.3072n 0.2854 0.4102nn
(0.1498) (0.1549) (0.1552) (0.1510) (0.1622) (0.1549) (0.1591) 0.1622
Professional services 0.0414 0.2961n 0.1748 0.0589 0.2534 0.1355 0.3256nn 0.0295
(0.1440) (0.1462) (0.1418) (0.1419) (0.1541) (0.1495) (0.1479) 0.1478
R&D 0.3174nnn 0.2867nnn 0.3080nnn 0.0253 0.2983nnn 0.3280nnn 0.3066nn 0.2698nnn
(0.1057) (0.1054) (0.1036) (0.1045) (0.1095) (0.1069) (0.1096) 0.1062
New2market
product
0.1955nn 0.1111 0.2073nn 0.1872n 0.1995n 0.1932n 0.0493 0.1176
innov (0.0965) (0.1004) (0.0980) (0.0989) (0.1039) (0.0998) (0.1006) 0.1020
New2market service 0.0179 0.0387 0.1641n 0.2162nn 0.2024nn 0.1983nn 0.2446nn 0.1034
innov (0.0959) (0.0964) (0.0952) (0.0970) (0.1020) (0.0964) (0.0992) 0.0974
Central government 0.2601nn 0.1439 0.2613nn 0.1533 0.1408 0.2037n 0.3105nn 0.3561nn
(0.1289) (0.1351) (0.1249) (0.1287) (0.1344) (0.1308) (0.1273) 0.1344
Social enterprise 0.1164 0.2687n 0.0448 0.6866nnn 0.0959 0.0579 0.0037 0.1810
(0.1319) (0.1350) (0.1322) (0.1427) (0.1433) (0.1381) (0.1386) 0.1392
_cons 0.1446 0.0568 1.0314nnn 0.4374nnn 0.1026 0.1318 1.0586nnn 0.4545nnn
(0.1722) (0.1806) (0.1826) (0.1776) (0.1861) (0.1805) (0.1854) 0.1831
Rho1 Rho2 Rho3 Rho4 Rho5 Rho6 Rho7
Rho/2 0.5016nnn (0.0615)
Rho/3 0.2912nnn (0.0576) 0.4042nnn (0.0579)
Rho/4 0.3652nnn (0.0568) 0.4333nnn (0.0635) 0.6464nnn (0.0598)
Rho/5 0.5798nnn (0.0709) 0.5912nnn (0.0673) 0.4736nnn (0.0646) 0.4243nnn (0.0624)
Rho/6 0.5369nnn (0.0610) 0.5309nnn (0.0620) 0.4152nnn (0.0601) 0.4712nnn (0.0611) 0.5545nnn (0.0673)
Rho/7 0.3910nnn (0.0640) 0.3483nnn (0.0582) 0.3883nnn (0.0578) 0.3832nnn (0.0593) 0.4314nnn (0.0615) 0.4610nnn (0.0598)
Rho/8 0.4180nnn (0.0659) 0.4817nnn (0.0603) 0.4418nnn (0.0579) 0.5045nnn (0.0599) 0.5144nnn (0.0611) 0.5596nnn (0.0638) 0.4898nnn (0.0625)
Log pseudolikelihood¼3454.72. Wald X 2(88)¼232.38. Observations: 787.
nnn po0.01.
nn po0.05.
n po0.10.
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Table A2
Multivariate probit. Procurement process-related barriers.
VARIABLES Consistent procurement (1) Large contracts participation (2) Sufﬁcient info tenders (3) Useful feedback (4) Unsolicited ideas (5) Private sector delivery history (6) PQ conditions (7)
Size 0.0233 0.2692nnn 0.2348nnn 0.1219n 0.0608 0.0322 0.2311nnn
(0.0638) (0.0657) (0.0638) (0.0725) (0.0703) (0.0659) (0.0679)
Facilities mgmt. services 0.2694 0.0437 0.2862 0.0248 0.2605 0.1858 0.0710
(0.2028) (0.2081) (0.2033) (0.2398) (0.2429) (0.2209) (0.2264)
Healthcare 0.0019 0.2918 0.1348 0.1234 0.4011n 0.2038 0.0360
(0.2029) (0.2142) (0.2075) (0.2406) (0.2400) (0.2125) (0.2205)
IT & ofﬁce equipment 0.0221 0.0997 0.2317 0.2994 0.4640 0.1668 0.1906
(0.2467) (0.2535) (0.2534) (0.2729) (0.2847) (0.2673) (0.2659)
Works 0.1438 0.2480 0.1186 0.4424n 0.4541nn 0.5742nnn 0.0230
(0.1864) (0.1868) (0.1818) (0.2073) (0.2131) (0.1927) (0.1959)
Professional services 0.1816 0.0096 0.0980 0.2421 0.4775nn 0.0880 0.0686
(0.1832) (0.1839) (0.1778) (0.2029) (0.2106) (0.1954) (0.1900)
R&D 0.0249 0.0092 0.0342 0.2781n 0.2662n 0.0709 0.1232
(0.1362) (0.1343) (0.1342) (0.1542) (0.1537) (0.1394) (0.1367)
Central government 0.2001 0.1768 0.0814 0.0882 0.0876 0.1642 0.0241
(0.1569) (0.1673) (0.1561) (0.1684) (0.1811) (0.1708) (0.1663)
New2market product innov 0.0042 0.1052 0.0418 0.1019 0.0826 0.0221 0.0884
(0.1280) (0.1287) (0.1244) (0.1359) (0.1396) (0.1313) (0.1291)
New2market service innov 0.0732 0.0552 0.1632 0.0359 0.2427n 0.0478 0.1735
(0.1211) (0.1230) (0.1204) (0.1332) (0.1398) (0.1238) (0.1243)
Social enterprise 0.4818nn 0.5498nnn 0.0587 0.2907 0.2575 0.2930 0.1686
(0.1887) (0.1782) (0.1754) (0.1958) (0.2020) (0.1839) (0.2020)
_cons 0.1943 0.2976 0.8490nnn 1.5429nnn 1.3428nnn 0.9950nnn 0.2390
(0.2202) (0.2217) (0.2202) (0.2577) (0.2599) (0.2334) (0.2328)
Rho1 Rho2 Rho3 Rho4 Rho5 Rho6
Rho/2 0.0144 (0.0730)
Rho/3 0.0654 (0.0705) 0.0630 (0.0735)
Rho/4 0.0853 (0.0800) 0.0217 (0.0787) 0.2129nn (0.0767)
Rho/5 0.2199nn (0.0791) 0.0295 (0.0766) 0.2577nn (0.0790) 0.0553 (0.0891)
Rho/6 0.0508 (0.0743) 0.0156 (0.0774) 0.1131 (0.0732) 0.1184 (0.0784) 0.1560 (0.0799)
Rho/7 0.1385 (0.0709) 0.4334nnn (0.0796) 0.0912 (0.0762) 0.1093 (0.0760) 0.0162 (0.0884) 0.0478 (0.0770)
Log pseudolikelihood¼1996.18. Wald X2(77)¼152.15. Observations: 500.
nnn po0.01.
nn po0.05.
n po0.10.
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Table A3
Barriers to innovation. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.
% of 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Dependent variables
1 Lack of demand for innovation 61 1.00
2 Speciﬁcations too prescriptive 66.88 0.32 1.00
3 Contracts not big enough 46.13 0.23 0.27 1.00
4 Contracts not long enough 55.38 0.23 0.31 0.42 1.00
5 Lack of interaction 73.88 0.36 0.39 0.29 0.26 1.00
6 Low capabilities of procurers 63.38 0.37 0.37 0.26 0.29 0.39 1.00
7 Inadequate manage of IPR 33.25 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.25 0.29 1.00
8 Poor management of risk 64.25 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.28 1.00
Explanatory variables
9 Size 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.18 1.00
10 Facilities mgmt. services 11.38 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 1.00
11 Healthcare 14.5 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.15 1.00
12 IT & ofﬁce equipment 7.63 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.12 1.00
13 Works 18.13 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.19 0.14 1.00
14 Professional services 19.88 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.18 0.20 0.14 0.24 1.00
15 R&D 65.4 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.20 0.08 1.00
16 Central government main client 17.13 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.19 0.10 0.09 0.22 1.00
17 New2market product innov 45.25 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.05 1.00
18 New2market service innov 53.38 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.12 0.06 0.04 1.00
19 Social enterprise 17.38 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.21 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.21 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.03
Table A4
Procurement process-related barriers. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.
% of 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Dependent variables
1 Consistent procurement 35.25 1.00
2 Large contracts participation 36.25 0.04 1.00
3 Sufﬁcient information tenders 43.63 0.05 0.05 1.00
4 Useful feedback 20.2 0.05 0.01 0.15 1.00
5 Unsolicited ideas 20.25 0.12 0.00 0.15 0.05 1.00
6 Private sector delivery history 26.2 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.09 1.00
7 PQ conditions 30.48 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.06 1.00
Explanatory variables
8 Size 0.01 0.19 0.18 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.17 1.00
9 Facilities mgmt. services 11.38 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04 1.00
10 Healthcare 14.5 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.15 1.00
11 IT & ofﬁce equipment 7.63 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.12 1.00
12 Works 18.13 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.20 0.15 1.00
13 Professional services 19.88 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.20 0.14 0.25 1.00
14 R&D 65.4 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.23 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.07 1.00
15 Central government main client 17.13 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.10 0.23 0.10 1.00
16 New2market product innov 45.25 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.22 0.10 0.13 0.24 0.15 1.00
17 New2market service innov 53.38 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.15 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.06 1.00
18 Social enterprise 17.38 0.12 0.16 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.02 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.14
E.U
yarra
et
al./
Technovation
34
(2014)
631
–645
64
4
References
Aho, E., Cornu, J., Georghiou, L., Subira, A., 2006. Creating an Innovative Europe.
Report of the Independent Expert Group on R&D and Innovation Appointed
Following the Hampton Court Summit. European Commission, Brussels.
Arrowsmith, S., Treumer, S., 2012. Competitive Dialogue in EU Procurement.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Aschhoff, B., Sofka, W., 2009. Innovation on demand—can public procurement drive
market success of innovations? Res. Policy 38 (8), 1235–1247.
Atkinson, T., 2005. Measurement of Government Output and Productivity for the
National Accounts. Final Report. HMSO, London.
Blind, K., 2013. “The Impact of Standardization and Standards on Innovation” Nesta
Working Paper 13/15. Nesta, London.
Byatt, I., 2001. Delivering Better Services for Citizens – A Review of Local
Government Procurement in England. Department for Transport, Local Govern-
ment and the Regions and the Local Government Association, London.
Cabral, L., Cozzi, G., Denicolo, V., Spagnolo, G., Zanza, M., 2006. Procuring innova-
tions. In: Dimitri, N., Piga, G., Spagnolo, G. (Eds.), Handbook of Procurement.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 483–530.
Caldwell, N.D., Roehrich, J.K., Davies, A.C., 2009. Procuring complex performance in
construction: London Heathrow terminal 5 and a private ﬁnance initiative
hospital. J. Purch. Supply Manag. 15 (3), 178–186.
Cloutier-Fisher, D., Skinner, M.W., 2006. Levelling the playing ﬁeld? exploring the
implications of managed competition for voluntary sector providers of long-
term care in small Town Ontario. Health Place 12 (1), 97–109.
Cox, G., 2005. Creativity in Business: Building on the UK's Strengths. HM, London.
Dalpé, R., DeBresson, C., Xiaoping, H., 1992. The public sector as ﬁrst user of
innovations. Research Policy 21 (3), 251–263.
DCLG/PwC, 2006. Developing the Local Government Services Market to Support the
Long Term Strategy for Local Government. Department of Communities and
Local Government, London.
Dimitri, N., Piga, G., Spagnolo, G., 2006. Introduction. In: Dimitri, N., Piga, G.,
Spagnolo., G. (Eds.), Handbook of Procurement. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, pp. 3–13.
DIUS, 2008. Innovation Nation. Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills,
London.
Edler, J., 2010. Demand oriented innovation policy. In: Smits, R., Kuhlmann, S.,
Shapira, P. (Eds.), The Theory and Practice of Innovation Policy an International
Research Handbook. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 177–208.
Edler, J., Edquist, C., Georghiou, L., Hommen, L., Hafner, S., Papadakou, M., Rigby, J.,
Rolfstam, M., Ruhland, S., Tsipouri, L., 2006. Innovation and Public Procure-
ment: Review of Issues at Stake. Ofﬁce for Ofﬁcial Publications of the European
Communities, Luxembourg.
Edler, J., Georghiou, L., 2007. Public procurement and innovation – resurrecting the
demand side. Res. Policy 36 (7), 949–963.
Edler, J., Uyarra, E., 2013. Public procurement of innovation. In: Brown, L., Osborne,
S. (Eds.), The Handbook of Innovation and Change in Public Sector Services.
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 224–237.
Edquist, C., Hommen, L., 2000. Public Technology Procurement and Innovation
Theory. In: Edquist, C., Hommen, L., Tsipouri, L.J. (Eds.), Public Technology
Procurement and Innovation. Kluwer Academic Pub., Dordrecht, pp. 5–70.
Edquist, C., Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, J.M., 2012. Public procurement for innovation as
mission-oriented innovation policy. Res. Policy 41 (10), 1757–1769.
Erridge, A., Greer, J., 2002. Partnerships and public procurement: building social
capital through supply relations. Public Adm. 80 (3), 503–522.
Erridge, A., Nondi, R., 1994. Public procurement, competition and partnership. Eur.
J. Purch. Supply Manag. 1 (3), 169–179.
European Commission. 2007. A Lead Market Initiative for Europe. COM (2007) 860
ﬁnal. Brussels.
European Commission. 2010. Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative: Innovation Union SEC
(2010) 1161. Brussels.
Flanagan, K., Uyarra, E., Laranja, M., 2011. Reconceptualising the ‘policy mix’ for
Innovation. Res. Policy 40 (5), 702–713.
Freel, M., Robson, P., 2004. Small ﬁrm innovation, growth and performance
evidence from Scotland and Northern England. Int. Small Bus. J. 22 (6),
561–575.
Gallup. 2011. Innobarometer 2010: Analytical Report – Innovation in Public
Administrations, Flash Eurobarometer 305.
Georghiou, L., 2007. Demanding Innovation Lead Markets, Public Procurement and
Innovation. NESTA, London.
Georghiou, L., Edler, J., Uyarra, E., Yeow, J., 2013. Public procurement as an
innovation policy tool: choice, design and assessment. Technol. Assess. Soc.
Chang. (Available online 24.10.13).
Georghiou, L., Y. Li, E. Uyarra, J. Edler. 2010. Public procurement for innovation in
small European countries. A Report from the ERA-PRISM: (Policies for Research
and Innovation in Small Member States to Advance the European Research
Area) OMC-Net Project, Brussels.
Geroski, P., 1990. Procurement policy as a tool of industrial policy. Int. Rev. Appl.
Econ. 4 (2), 182–198.
GHK. 2010. Evaluation of SMEs’ Access to Public Procurement Markets in the EU, DG
Enterprise and Industry, Brussels.
Glover, A., 2008. Accelerating the SME Economic Engine: Through Transparent,
Simple and Strategic Procurement. HM Treasury, London.
Green, P., 2010. Efﬁciency Review: Key Findings and Recommendations. Cabinet
Ofﬁce, London.
Guerzoni, M., E. Raiteri. 2012. Innovative Procurement and R&D Subsidies:
Compounding Effects and New Empirical Evidence on Technological Policies
in a Quasi-experimental Setting. Working paper No. 18/2012, Department of
Economics “Cognetti de Martiis”, University of Turin.
Heseltine, M., 2012. No Stone Unturned in Pursuit of Growth. BIS, London.
HM Treasury 2005. Cox Review of Creativity in Business: Building on the UK's
Strengths. London.
HM Treasury, 2010a. Review of Competitive Dialogue. HM Treasury, London.
HM Treasury, 2010b. Public Expenditure Outturn Update. HM Treasury, London.
Home Ofﬁce, and OGC. 2004. Think Smart, Think Voluntary sector-Good Practice
Guidance on Procurement of Services from the Voluntary and Community
Sector. London: the Ofﬁce of Government Commerce and the Home Ofﬁce.
House of Lords. 2011. Public Procurement as a Tool to Stimulate Innovation. Science
and Technology Committee – First Report. London.
Julius, D., 2008. “Understanding the Public Services Industry: How Big, How Good,
Where Next?”. Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform
(BERR), London.
Kok, W., 2004. Facing The Challenge. The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employ-
ment. Ofﬁce for Ofﬁcial Publications of the European Communities,
Luxembourg.
Lember, V., Kalvet, T., Kattel, R., 2013. Public Procurement Policy for Innovation:
International Perspectives. Springer, New York.
Li, Y. 2011. Public Procurement as a Demand-side Innovation Policy Tool in
China – A National Level Case Study. Paper presented at the 2001 DRUID
Conference, Copenhagen, June15–17, 2011.
McCrudden, C., 2007. Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement, &
Legal Change. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Metcalfe, S., Georghiou, L., 1997. Equilibrium and Evolutionary Foundations of
Technology Policy. CRIC Discussion Paper, No. 3. Centre for Research on
Innovation and Competition, University of Manchester, Manchester.
Myoken, Y., 2010. Demand-orientated policy on leading-edge industry and tech-
nology: public procurement for innovation. Int. J. Technol. Manag. 49 (1),
196–219.
NAO, 2000. Supporting Innovation: Managing Risk in Government Departments.
Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. National Audit Ofﬁce, London.
NESTA, 2012. Plan I: The Case for Innovation-led Growth. NESTA, London.
Nugroho, Yanuar, 2011. Opening the black box: the adoption of innovations in the
voluntary sector—the case of indonesian civil society organisations. Res. Policy
40 (5), 761–777 (June).
OECD, 2011. Demand Side Innovation Policy. OECD, Paris.
OFT, 2002. Innovation and Competition Policy Part I – Conceptual Issues. Ofﬁce of
Fair Trading, London.
OGC. 2004. Capturing Innovation: Nurturing. Suppliers' Ideas in the Public Sector.
Pavitt, K., 1984. Sectoral patterns of technical change: towards a taxonomy and a
theory. Res. Policy 13 (6), 343–373.
Peck, F., Cabras, I., 2011. The impact of local authority procurement on local
economies the case of Cumbria, North West England. Public Policy Adm. 26
(3), 307–331 (July 1).
Porter, M.E., 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. Free Press, New York.
Rolfstam, M., 2013. Public Procurement and Innovation. Edward Elgar Publishing,
Cheltenham.
Rothwell, R., Zegveld, W., 1981. Government regulations and innovation – indus-
trial innovation and public policy. In: Rothwell, R., Zegveld, W. (Eds.), Industrial
Innovation and Public Policy. Frances Pinter, London, pp. 116–147.
The Economist, 2010. Promoting Innovation: Growth on the Cheap. May 27th 2010
(accessed 20.10.13).
Treumer, S., Uyarra, E., 2013. Competitive dialogue and contractual design fostering
innovation and need analysis. In: Piga, G., Treumer, S. (Eds.), The Applied Law
and Economics of Public Procurement. Routledge, London, pp. 13–27.
Tsipouri, L., Edler, J., Rolfstam, M., Uyarra, E., 2010. Risk Management in the
Procurement of Innovation. Concepts and Empirical Evidence in the European
Union. European Commission, Brussels.
Uyarra, E., 2010. Opportunities for Innovation Through Local Government Procure-
ment: A Case Study of Greater Manchester. Research Report. NESTA, London.
Uyarra, E. 2013. Review of Measures in Support of Public Procurement of Innova-
tion. Nesta Working Paper No. 13/17. London: Nesta.
Uyarra, E., Edler, J., Gee, S., Georghiou, L., Yeow, J., 2013. Public procurement for
innovation: the UK case. In: Lember, L., Kalvet, T., Kattel, R. (Eds.), Public
Procurement Policy for Innovation: International Perspectives. New York, Springer,
pp. 233–257.
Uyarra, E., Flanagan, K., 2010. Understanding the Innovation Impacts of Public
Procurement. Eur. Plan. Stud. 18 (1), 123–143.
Vecchiato, R., Roveda, C., 2014. Foresight for public procurement and regional
innovation policy: the case of Lombardy. Res. Policy 43 (2), 438–450.
Wilkinson, R., Georghiou, L., Cave, J., et al., 2005. Public Procurement for Research
and Innovation. Ofﬁce for Ofﬁcial Publications of the European Communities,
Luxembourg.
Yukins, C., Piga, G., 2012. Dialogue: set-asides for small and medium ﬁrms, as in the
USA system with the small business act that reserves shares of tenders to SMEs
only. In: Piga, G., Treumer, S. (Eds.), The Applied Law and Economics of Public
Procurement. Routledge, London, pp. 215–230.
E. Uyarra et al. / Technovation 34 (2014) 631–645 645
